Reports
- Biosafety Laboratories: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation's Five BSL-4 Laboratories. GAO-08-1092, September 17.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1092
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d081092high.pdf - Indoor Mold: Better Coordination of Research on Health Effects and More Consistent Guidance Would Improve Federal Efforts. GAO-08-980, September 30.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-980
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d08980high.pdf - Information Technology: SSA Has Taken Key Steps for Managing Its Investments, but Needs to Strengthen Oversight and Fully Define Policies and Procedures. GAO-08-1020, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1020
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d081020high.pdf - Nonprofit Hospitals: Variation in Standards and Guidance Limits Comparison of How Hospitals Meet Community Benefit Requirements. GAO-08-880, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-880
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d08880high.pdf - Risk-Based Capital: New Basel II Rules Reduced Certain Competitive Concerns, but Bank Regulators Should Address Remaining Uncertainties. GAO-08-953, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-953
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d08953high.pdf
Related Products
- Indoor Mold: Ongoing and Recently Completed Federal Research Activities (GAO-08-984SP, September 2008), an E-supplement to GAO-08-980. GAO-08-984SP, September 30. [Internet only]
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-984SP/ - Motor Fuels: Stakeholder Views on Compensating for the Effects of Gasoline Temperature on Volume at the Pump. GAO-08-1114, September 25.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1114
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d081114high.pdf - Management: DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing. GAO-09-49, October 15.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-49
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0949high.pdf
Correspondence
- Multiple Agencies Provide Assistance to Service-disabled Veterans or Entrepreneurs, but Specific Needs Are Difficult to Identify and Coordination Is Weak. GAO-09-11R, October 15.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-11R
http://www.baltimoreexaminer.com/opinion/112308editorial.html
ReplyDeleteSelf (inflicted) defense can up risk
By The Baltimore Examiner Newspaper
- 11/23/08
Two clear facts shine from the clouded mystery of anthrax attacks on America and our government’s tenuous claim seven years later of closing the case with the suicide of a suspect.
Fact No. 1: Government warnings about anthrax being a weapon of mass destruction were false. Somebody dispersed the most lethal strain our tax dollars can produce — weapons-grade or near enough — via the U.S. Postal Service, exposing tens of millions of people, yet managed to infect 22. Five died. But from anthrax vaccination, at least 21 died and thousands reported a wide range of illnesses.
Fact No. 2: If FBI accusations against their prime suspect in the 2001 attack are true, it means billions of dollars taxpayers invested on the premise of prevention actually increased the risk.
When senior biodefense researcher Bruce Ivins died from an overdose of Tylenol 3 after being identified as sole suspect, our central
government declared the crime solved.
However, co-workers at the U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick say the actions attributed to Ivins over the time the government claims are scientifically impossible.
This is going to be another never-healing wound in America’s body of unsolved mysteries.
But mystery should not distract us from the truth. Our government’s response to bioweapons is raising the danger level from them.
Think it through, citizens. The very vaccination program intended to thwart anthrax apparently sickened and killed more people than an actual mass attack.
After the 2001 attack, our government hurled $41 billion at bioterror with no real coordination or study. High-level labs multiplied threefold. A dozen agencies exponentially increased the number of facilities and workers handling pathogens. Now we have more than 15,000 potential Bruce Ivins.
Meanwhile, our leaders provided no adequate increase in oversight, coordination, training, security, surveillance, testing, background checks or psychological screening.
Statistically, something going horribly wrong now approaches sure thing. That is not just a threat to residents of Frederick, Bethesda and other communities. It is, as the spread of anthrax spores proved, a threat to the whole world.
We learned in 2001 the actual danger from anthrax was lower than vaccine.
But these biohazard labs grow a lot more dangerous pathogens than anthrax. The next one to get out could kill millions.
President Bush must immediately halt programs until we can impose coordinated oversight, then assess security and capacity needs.
We must not let self-defense become self-inflicted catastrophe.
Link to GAO reports
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-108T High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-333R Issues Associated with Expansion
Read the vaccine series
http://www.baltimoreexaminer.com/local/crime/Scientific_impossibility.html Scientific impossibility
http://www.baltimoreexaminer.com/local/112008anthraxpart2.html Sickening results
http://www.baltimoreexaminer.com/local/112008anthrax.html Costly program
http://www.baltimoreexaminer.com/local/112008anthraxletter.html Pentagon responds